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SCHOOL NOTES
The Glee Club will start on a two weeks'
trip on the 26th inst. Concerts will be
given at Pottsville, Shamokin, Hazelton,
Johnstown, Harrisburg, and towns of lesser importance.
Hillyer, Bishop, and Morehouse, attended the reception given by the Sigma
Alpha Epsilon fraternity on the 3rd inst.
Boughton and Wilson were in Harrisburg on 14th inst., guests of Judge Morrison, of the Superior Court.
Rev. Samuel Kauffman, of the Senior
class, lectured in Harrisburg on Sunday
evening, the 15th inst. His subject was
"The Hebrew of to-day."
Patterson, of the Junior class, was absent from school for several days in the
early part of the month, assisting his
father in a political campaign. The latter
was a candidate for the nomination of
sheriff on the Repuhlican ticket in Blair
county.

The Middlers have completed Decedents' Estates and have begun the study of
Wills.
Wm. Reno, of Allentown, was a guest
of his brother, Claude, of the Junior class,
this month.
The Senior class has about completed
arrangements for its banquet. The intention is to hold it either in the latter part
of April or during Commencement week.
The announcement that Iively and
Spencer do not intend to play on the
baseball team this year, caused disappointment and regret among the law and college men. Their presence on the team
would considerably strengthen it for they
both play fast and consistent ball. Their
absence will be felt since none of the candidates trying for the position held by
them, other than Savage, seem to be as
fast as either of them.
It is hoped that some arrangements will
be made whereby they may be seen on the
diamond again this year.
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Abner Jones, of Wilkes-Barre, private
secretary for John Cunningham, one of
the largest coal operators in the Anthracite region, was a guest of Morgan of the
Junior class, for several days this month.
Win. Elkin, treasurer of the Moosic
Glass Works, located at Moosic, Pa., was
a guest of Sherbine of the Senior class, for
several days recently.
Another legal fraternity, the Theta
Lamba Phi, was organized here during the
past month.
About 15 law students,
selected from the Junior, Middle and
Senior classes compose the organization.
They have secured a suite of rooms on
West High street over Spath's Barber
shop.
Mrs. Jones, of Chester, Pa., is a guest of
her son, John Ralston of the Junior class.
The Junior class has organized a baseball team with the intention of challenging
the Middle class to play as soon as the
season opens. Rauffenbart is captain.
In theY. M. 0. A. entertainment on the
evening of the 15th, several law men participated. Hillyer rendered a violin selection, Bishop sang, and Cisney recited.
It is evident that the work done in our
Moot court is attracting the attention of
the legal profession and that the questions decided there are appreciated by the
profession. In the January number of the
Justice of tjie Peace, the case of Bates v.
Holbrook, published in the December issue of The Forum, was republished in full.
The case was on of negligent shooting of
a trespasser. Claycomb was judge and
Bishop, Jones, Cooper, and Drumheller
were the counsel.
The production of "Charley's Aunt" by
the College Dramatic Club, the forepart of
the month for the benefit of the Athletic
Association, brought out some dramatic
ability in the Law School the existence
of which few of the law students suspected. Among those who participated
were, Lannard, Flynn, Hassartand Cook.
The role of an Irish servant as portrayed
by Flynn, and that of a polished villian by
Cook, were parts of prominence and were

rendered with a proper conception of the
characters. Between the acts, Hassart
made a big hit with his songs and monologue. Lannard intelligently rendered
one of the prominent characters in the
play.
ALUMNI NOTES.
E. A. Delaney, a member of the present
Senior class, until the beginning of the
Christmas vacation in 1901, was recently
admitted to the Wayne County Bar. He
will locate in Honesdale, Pa.
C. E. Daniels, '98, of Scranton, Pa., was
in town fora few days during the present
month.
Ed. Rodgers, who was a member of the
present Senior class in its first year, and
who left here to enter the University of
Minnesota, was elected captain of the foot
ball team of that institution for. the next
season. In athletic circles, this is considered a big honor, the foot ball team of
that University being considered the fastest in the west.
James B. O'Keefe, of Wilkes-Barre, Pa.,
a member of the class of 1900, was recently
admitted to the Supreme Court.
Hindman; a memberof thepresentSenior
class last year, is a Senior at the Pittsburg
Law School and will be graduated this
year. He will immediately take the examination for admission to the Allegheny
County Bar.
J. H. Walker, class of '96, was elected
burgess of Bellefonte on the Democratic
ticket last month. Although Bellefonte
is a Republican borough, he was elected
by a large majority.
Elmer S. Welsh, '02, who is practicing
in York county, is a candidate for solicitor
of the Board of School Control in the city
of York.

W. E. SCHNEE ELECTED SOLICITOR.
The following is taken from the Montgomery Mirror: "At a meeting of council last Monday night, Mr. William E.
Schnee was elected borough solicitor. The
selection in this case was a fortunate one,
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as Mr. Schnee is at present with F. P.
Cummings, Esq., city solicitor of Williamsport, and any assistance needed in
municipal Jaw will be forthcoming. Mr.
Schnee is rapidly forging ahead, and will
no doubt make his mark at the bar."
M r. Schnee was a member last year of
the present Senior class, but did not return this year. He is a member of the bar
of Lycoming county, this state, and the
bar of West Virginia, having recently
passed the examination prescribed by the
State Board in the latter state. Montgomery, the town of which he has been
elected solicitor, is one of the thriving
boroughs in Lycoming county. Having
considerable litigation, it pays its solicitor
a reasonable salary.
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U. S. Constitution, IVth Amendment,
sec. 1; Cooley on Constitutional Law, 2d
edition, page 195; Godcharles v. Wigeman, 113 Pa. 431; Bauer v. Reynolds, 14
Pa. C. C. 497.
The statute violates art. 1, sec. 10, of U.
S. Constitution, inasmuch as it impairs
the obligation of a contract.
A subsequent attempt to talSe away the
right to recover damages would impair the
obligation of a contract.
Eppinger v. Kenney, 115 U. S. 566; Wilmington R. R. v. King, 91 U. S. 3; Bronsore v. Kinzel, et al, 1 Howard, 311 ; White
v. Hart, 13 Wallace 646.
KNAPPENBERGER and MOREHOUSE for
defendant.
If, after the promise is made, an act is
passed rendering the performance illegal,
the promise is at an end, and the promissor is no longer bound. Hanger v. Abbott, 6 Wallace, 532; Trums v. Hartford
Insurance Company, 13 Wallace 158.
No action will lie upon a contract prohibBOOK REVIEW
ited by statute. Seidrubrudes v. Charles,
A TREATISE ON COMMERCIAL PAPER 4S. & R. 151.
AND
NEGOTIABLE
OPINION OF THE COURT.
INSTRUMENTS OF
It seems that Thorne and Simcox made
LAW.-By James W. Eaton and Frank
a contract in Pennsylvania on August 11,
B. Gilbert. Matthew Bender, Albany, ZV.
1901, under which Simcox undertook to
Y., 1903.
supply Thorne with one thousand (1,000)
Review will follow.
bushels of beets, to be grown in the year
1901, in the state of New York. After the
MOOT COURT.
making of the contract but prior to the
JACOB THORNE vs. SILAS SIMCOX.
planting of the crop of that year, the legislature of the state of New York enacted
Constitutional law-Police power of a
that no beets of that year's growth should
state -Interstate commerce-Impairing be exported from the state into any other
of contractual obligations-Restriction state.
upon exaortation of articlesintendedfor
In consequence Simcox made no effort
sale in other states-Contract-Impossi- to procure the beets.
bility of performance.
Thorne now sues for damages, and Simcox sets up as his defense, illegality of the
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
performance of the contract.
Thorne and Simeox made a contract in
The three questions involved in the case
Pennsylvania on August 11, 1900, under
are, to wit: First: Was the law as passed
which Simcox undertook to supply Thorne
by the legislature of New York, prohibitwith one thousand (1000) bushels of beets
ing the shipping of the beets out of the
to be grown in the year 1901 in the state of
state, constitutional? Secondly: If it was
New York. Prior to the planting of the
constitutional, was Simcox excused from
crop of that year, the legislature of the
performing his contract? Thirdly: If it
state enacted that no beets of that year's
growth should be exported from the state was unconstitutional, is Simcox liable to
Thorne in damages for the non-performinto any other state. In consequence
ance of the contract?
Simcox made no effort to procure the beets.
We can answer the second and third
Thorne sues for damages. The defense
questions without very much hesitation.
is the illegality of the performance of the
Clearly, if this law as passed was consticontract.
tutional, then Simcox is excused from the
DIvELY and HUBLER for plAintiff.
performance of this contract, and is not
Any citizen of the United States may
liable in any way, shape or form to Thorne
make any contract that is not against
existing laws or public policy.
for damages.
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If the law was unconstitutional, it is of
no avail, but null and void, and therefore
would not have prevented Simcox from
performing his part of the contract, and
he would, therefore, be liable to the full extent in damages to Thorne. Both these
questions are so apparent on their face,
that further discussion we deem is unnecessary.
But now, we come to the first and more
weighty question: Is this enactment constitutional or unconstitutional? We never
fail to appreciate fully the amount of carefulness and forethought which should be
used when deciding a question of this sort,
a question involving that masterful work,
the Constitution of the United States.
The Constitution of the United States
gives every citizen of the United States a
right to make and enter into any contract
whatsoever, providing this contract is not
against the existing laws or public policy.
The Constitution of the United States
also provides that no state shall pass any
law impairing the obligations of contracts,
either executed or executory. Now, did this
law impair the obligations of this contract?
Clearly, we think it did. It not only made
the contract unenforceable, but null and
void and, therefore, clearly unconstitutional from this standpoint.
But there are several exceptions to the
broad rule above as laid down by the Constitution ofthe United States. Now, let us
see whether this act of the legislature of
New York came under one of these exceptions.
The legislature, as stated by one of the
judges of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in 56 Pa. 46, has a right to change
the remedies, and this even though the
creditor may thereby be hindered or delayed, if they do not deprive him of the
rights he had when the contract was made.
We think it is very obvious that the act
of the legislature in controversy did not
come under any such exception as this
one.
The legislatures of the different states are
also given by the Constitution of the United
States certain police powers, which are
defined by Judge Cooley in general terms
as "that power which inheres in the legislature to make, ordain, and establish all
manner of reasonable regulations and laws
whereby to preserve peace and order of

society and the safety of its members, and
to prescribe the mode and manner in which
every one may secure and enjoy that which
is his own, as not to preclude a corresponding use and enjoyment of their own by
others." And while the Constitution of
the United States reserves to Congress the
right to regulate commerce with foreign
nations, and among the several states, and
among the Indian tribes; yet the legislatures of the different states are allowed to
regulate the exporting and importing of
articles which on account of their existing
condition would spread disease or pestilence. Instances of this sort would be articles infected with disease germs, or products which due to decomposition would
be unfit for consumption. Such articles
would not be legitimate subjects of trade
and commerce, and, therefore, would not
fall within the protection of the commerce
clause of the constitution, but would fall
within the police powers of the state, and
would be subject to state legislation.
Now, did this act in controversy fall
within this last mentioned exception, the
police powers of the state? We think not.
It may have been enacted with that idea
in view, but it falls far short of it, and as
it stands, it is an infringement on the
rights reserved exclusively to the congress
of the United States. It certainly could not
be that the legislature had in contemplation that these beets, which would he
grown in the year 1901, would turn out to
be infected with any germs of disease, and
even though they did have such an unwarranted contemplation, they had no legal
right to pass such alaw untilsuch beets really had become infected. It does not appear
what the purpose of the legislature was in
passing this act, but from the circunistances under which the act was passed,
we must conclude that there was no reason which would possibly come under the
police powers given it. We, therefore,
declare the act unconstitutional, and of no
effect whatsoever.
Simcox's proper mode of proceeding
would have been to deliver the beets, and
if action was brought against him, defend
on the ground that this act was unconstitutional. As he did not do this, he is certainly liable to Thorne in damages, to the
full amount of damages, whatever they
=3 be.
JACOBS,J.
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Simcox agreed to supply Thorne with
1000 bushels of beets, to be grown in the
state of New York, during the year 1901.
Before the planting of the crop of that
year, the law of New York was so changed
as to prohibit the exportation of beets of
that year's growth. If this law was valid,
it furnished an obstacle to Simcox's performance. He was not bound to violate
the law in order to perform, nor is he liable
to Thorne for non-performance.
Clark
Cont. 681.
If the law was not valid, it was doubtless Simcox's duty to ignore it. Whether
he ignored it or not, it would furnish no
excuse for his non-performance. Was the
law valid?
Its invalidity, if it be invalid, must result from its contravening the Constitution
of New York, or the Constitution of the
United States. The former has not been
proven, and we can take no judicial notice
of it. Let us see whether the Constitution
of the United States avoids the statute in
question.
It might be suggested that this statute
interferes with interstate commerce. The
regulation ofcommerce between the several
states is within the competence of congress. There are many cases, in which
states have attempted to regulate, restrain
or entirely prohibit importations from
other states. These attempts have almost
always been held ultra vires. We think
it needs no argument to show that to restrain or prohibit exportations into other
states is equally a regulation of interstate
commerce.
The exclusion of the regulation of interstate commerce, from the powers of a
state, is not, however, the exclusion of the
regulation of the production of the articles
that, if produced, might become the subjects of that commerce. A state, e. g., can
prevent the manufacture of liquor, although, once manufactured, it could not
prevent its exportation to other states.
Kiddv. Pearson, 128 U. S. 1. Agriculture
may be deemed, for this'purpose, a form of
manufacture. The state can as well regulate the former as the latter, it can as well
forbid the production by tillage, of articles,
though, if produced, adapted to export, as
by manufacture. To forbid, before the
planting of a crop, its exportation, is
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practically to forbid its cultivation, if tile
product is designed for export.
Has the state the power to forbid mantfacture of objects designed for export,
while permitting that of objects of the
same kind, not designed for export? We
see no good reason for denying the power.
If manufacture is not commerce, and the
regulation of it is with the state, although
it affects commerce by affecting the production of that which, when produced,
might be an article of commerce, the state
may permit the manufacture, when its
products are to be consumed by its own
citizens, and forbid it, when they are to be
consumed in part by citizens of other
states.
In Geer v. State of Connecticut, 161 U.
S. 519, it was held, in snbstance, that as
the state could regulate the capture and
appropriation by individuals of wild partridges, quail, etc., it could condition the
appropriation so that the captor could not
transport the birds beyond the state.
When private property, the birds were a
subject of interstate commerce, but the
state could allow the making of them into
private property on the condition, that.
when taken, they should be consumed
only by the residents of the state. So far
as the commerce clause of the constitution
is concerned, we see no reason for saying
that New York could not prohibit the
bringing of beets into existence, except on
the condition that they should -not be exported from the state.
It is suggested that the New York law
violates the obligation of a contract. This
we cannot concede. The contract is subject
to implied conditions, one of which is that
performance shall not become impossible,
whether by change of law or otherwise.
There is not, and never has been an obligation to perform, when performance is impossible. How then is the obligation impaired by the event, which makes the performance impossible, whether it be a
change of the law or some other event. It
would be a great inconvenience to hold
that if a contract for something permitted
by the law, is made, no change of policy
can be adQpted by the state, until such contract has been performed. A contracts to
sell and deliver to B a slave for $1000. Before the time for performance arrives, the
state passes an emancipation constitution
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or statute. Are we to be told that this
Every reasonable intendment should be
constitution or statute is void, because it made in support of the legislation of a
impairs the obligation of a contract? Or state. There may have been a worthy
rather, that the parties havd taken the object, of the prohibition of exportation of
risk of a change of the law, and that the
contract was virtually conditioned on the beets and the prohibition may have been
a sensible means of promoting that object.
continuance of the legal possibility of perPossibly the object was to encourage sugar
formance?
manufacture, or to secure an abundant
It is suggested that the New York act
and cheap supply of beets for man or
violates the prohibition found in the 14th
animal in New York. We are not preAmendment to the Federal Constitution.
against any state's depriving any person of pared to say that a state may not regulate
the use of its land, its forests, its fisheries,
his liberty or property without due process
its deposits of petroleum or coal, so as to
of law. The farm-owner, but for this act,
promote the welfare of its own people,
would have had the right to grow beets
even to the incidental deprivation of the
and sell them beyond the state, at prices
better, possibly, than he could command people of other states, of a supply of imif he was deprived of the power of export- portant commodities. The constitution
does not require New York to share the
ing them. The act took away one of his
products of its land with the people of
liberties, that of sale beyond his state. It
took away one of the advantages of prop- Pennsylvania, nor the latter, the products
of its mines with the people of New York.
erty, that of free sale of its products. But
It follows that the New York statute
was the deprivation without due process
was valid, and that no cause of action acof law?
crued to the plaintiff from the defendant's
This incurably vague phrase was intronon-performance of his contract.
duced into constitutions, state and federal,
Judgment reversed.
apparently, for no other purpose than to
admonish the legislatures, that some deJONES vs. BUD.
privations of liberty or property would be
Contract-Restraintupon marriage-Pubundue, and to caution them to suspect any
lie policy-Limitationsof the doctrineproposed legislation, and to refrain from
Effect of mixed consideration-Recovery
it. if it seemed harsh, or unjust, or extraon quantum meruit.
ordinary, or than to give a pretext for reSTATEMENT OF THE CASE.
view of the legislation by the courts, and
Jones and Smith entered into the folfor its annulment, if in their opinion it
lowingcontract: "In consideration of the
seemed harsh, or unjust, or extraordinary.
The language used by text-writers and promise of Jones to serve Smith in the
judges, in attempting to define the phrase, capacity of gardener as long as he should
show how indefinite and unmeaning it is. live and not to marry during that time,"
Cf. Cooley, Const. Law, p. 242 et. seq. Smith agreed to pay Jones $500 per year,
and to employ him as long as he lived.
Many limitations on freedom, as onerous
as this, have been sustained, in respect to Jones worked the year and remained unthe hours of work, to the qualification for married. Smith then dies and the above
trades or vocations, etc. The same pro- action is brought by Jones against Bud,
hibition is applied to the government of Smith's executor, who refused to piy the
the United States in Art. V of the Amend- year's salary due. The trial court charged
ment, yet the United States do not hesi- the jury that upon the above facts the contract is void and the plaintiff cannot. retate to say that men shall not buy goods
from foreigners, except on paying a duty, cover and accordingly to find for the depractically a fine, to the United States, fendant. Exceptions were overruled. The
and no publicist doubts that the prohibi- plaintiff appeals, alleging the court's
tion might be made absolute. If a man charge to be error.
VASTINE and DRUMHELLER for the
can be forbidden to buy from whom he
will, and the prohibition be due process of plaintiff.
The consideration exclusive of the 'relaw, it is hard to see that the prohibition
straint of marriage" was sufficient to susagainst his selling to whom he will is in- tain the agreement. Kidder v. Boom Co.,
onsistent with "due process of law."
24 Pa. 193; Eichelberger's, 170 Pa. 242.
c
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which enjoins upon any particular person
the duty to marry, nor can anyone be
punished for marrying. To marry or not
to marry is left to the free choice of
all who are eligible to marriage. Hence,
to omit to marry is not illegal, and the
promise to omit is one which the law will
not enforce. It would appear naturally to
follow that the only result ofmaking such
a promise would be that no legal right
could be founded on the promise, and no
remedy afforded for its breach.
The promise not to marry was a mere
OPINION OF THE COURT.
incident to the main purpose entered into
That contracts in restraint of marriage
because it was supposed by remaining
are void, as being contrary to public
single Jones could better perform his conpolicy, is conceded. But the question
tract. In other words, the promise to rehere is whether the contract to render sermain unmarried did not enter into or bevices, fully performed by the one party, so
come part of the substance of the general
rests upon the promise not to marry, or is
agreement.
so tainted by that part of the agreement as
That agreement was for the performto be incapable of enforcement. The conance of services. If the performance was
sideration moving to the agreement on
adequate and the services, rendered in a
the part of Jones was two-fold, one, the
satisfactory manner, their value could
promise to perform the service agreed
neither he enhanced or diminished by
upon; the other, not to marry during the
the fact that they had been rendered by a
continuation of such service. The first
single man rather than a married one; so
was a valid promise and of itself eufficient
that, had the plaintiff married, yet, if he
to support the promise of the other party ;
performed his contract, the recipient of
the second was a void promise not affordhis services would lose nothing. As a
ing any consideration whatever.
matter of fact, he did not marry and he
The general rule is that, if one of two
performed the services.
considerations for a promise be merely
Courts refuse to enforce or recognize cervoid, the other will support the promise,
tain classes of acts because against public
although, if one of two considerations be
policy. A contract in restraint of marunlawful, the promise of the other party
riage is of this nature. But it does not folis void; this rule, however, has many exlow that all contracts which may have an
ceptions as will be shown. That is, if one
element of insufficiency, and may be void
of two considerations is void merely for
as to one feature, are incapable of enforceinsufficiency and not for illegality the
ment.
other will support the contract. Widoe
Decisions are abundant in support of the
v. Webb, 20 Ohio 435; Bliss v. Negis, 8
proposition that, even where the acts of
Mass. 51; Carleton v. Woods, 28 N. H.
the parties have been in violation of a
290; Woodruff v. Heinman, 11 Vt. 592.
positive
law, a contract under some cirThis distinction between a contract
cunstances may be enforced. Lesher v.
merely void and an illegal contract would
Howard Bank, 33 Md. 558. So it is here.
seem to he an important one. Courts, as
The plaintiff, Jones, rendered a meritorious
a general proposition, are open for the enservice based upon his contract, and we
forcement of contracts not for their debelieve that he is entitled to receive the
struction. A void contract is one which
amount agreed upon in his contract.
has no legal force, and which for that reaConsistent with the reasons above given,
son cannot be enforced.
it must appear that the charge of the
An unlawful contract is one to do an
learned court below was in error. For
act which the law forbids, or to omit an
these reasons the verdict is set aside and
act which the law enjoins, and for that
judgment entered for the plaintiff for $500,
reason is unenforceable. There is no prointerest and costs.
vision, either by common
The words of the contract effect a limitation and not a condition. Holtz's estate, 38 Pa. 422; Cornell v. Lovett's
Exrs., 35 Pa. 100; Cook v. Trimble, 9
Watts 15.
WILLrAMsoN and S. KAUFmAN for the
defendant.
The contract includes a condition in restraint of marriage and is void. Williamson v. Cowden, 13 Mo. 211 ; Mandlebaumv.
McDowell, 29 Mich. 78; Hoops v. Dundas,
10 Pa. 75 ; McIlvaine v. Gethen, 3 Wharton
575.
Courts will not enforce such contracts.
Swing v. Munson, 191 Pa. 582.

law or statute,

MIL7hLER, J
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Jones and Smith exchanged promises.
Jones promised to serve Smith as gardener
during his, Smith's life, and not to marry
during this period. Smith promised Jones
to pay him $500 yearly for his service
during Smith's life. The relation was
terminated at the end of the year, by
Smith's death. This action is by Jones,
against Smith's executor, for one year's
salary.
No cause for defeating the action, other
than the stipulation concerning Jones'
marriage is suggested. That the contract
was otherwise lawful, will hardly be disputed. But it is urged that the contract
furnished a motive for Jones' abstaining
from matrimony, and for that reason is
invalid.
It has been said that furnishing a motive,
in some forms, against marriage, is contrary to sound policy. In Hartley v. Rice,
10 East 22, there-was a bet by A and B, of
50 guineas, that B would not marry in six
years. B did not marry in the time, and
brought an action to recover the 50
guineas. Recovery was prevented, because such a contract "discourages marriage," and no circumstances were developed making desistance from marriage
for six years reasonable. A promise to A,
a woman, by B, not to marry anybody but
A, and to pay her 1000Z, in case he should
marry any one else, was held void, in an
action by A, brought three months after
B's marriage with another person, because
it restrained B from marrying anybody
else than A, while it did not pledge him
to marry A, or A to marry him. Lowe v.
Newsham, 4 Burr. 2225. A bond for the
payment of $1000 to Sterling, provided he
was not lawfully married in the course of
six months, was held void, notwithstanding that the period of restraint was so brief,
and that the obligee did not bind himself
not to marry within that time. Sterling v.
Sennickson, 5 N. J. L. 766. In Clalfant v.
Payton, 91 Ind. 202, a contract was made,
whereby B was to pay A $3,960 at the end
of two years, should he not have married,
but, should he have married, then to pay
him $5.50 per day for every day of singleness within that period. It was held void.
As the parties were inparidelicto, money
paid on account of it by the party whose
marriage was the subject, could not be re-

covered back.
Ind. 292

Cf. James v. Jollison, 94

It does not follow, however, that all dispositions of property, whose effect would
be to give a motive to celibacy, are forbidden. It is competent for one, e. g., to
grant, or devise, or bequeath to another,
until his marriage. So far as the influence
on marriage is concerned ,the difference is
unsubstantial between granting property
until the marriage of the grantee, and
granting it for the life of the grantee, with
a proviso against the grantee's marriage.
The grantee is equally intimidated from
marriage in both cases, or if there is any
difference, his fear is greater in the former
than in the latter case, because marriage in
the former i2pso facto terminates the estate,
while it does not in the latter. Cf. Cornell
v. Lovett's Ex. 35 Pa. 100; Hotz's Estate,
38 Pa. 422; Hogan v. Curtin, 88 N. Y. 162;
Bostick v. Blades, 59 Md. 231.
There may be cases in which it is not
only the policy of the law to encourage,
but it is its policy to discourage marriages,
i. e. when the person in question is insane,
or diseased, or so industrially inefficient,
as to make his capacity to provide for wife
or children very improbable. In the case
before us, Jones may have been conscious
of his bodily weakness, or of his unfitness
to compete rigorously for work. A happy
accident may have brought to him,
through his arrangement with Smith, an
opportunity to support himself for what
promised to be a considerable period. The
undertaking not to marry was not irrelevant, or capricious. His freedom from
family obligations, made him a more desirable and qualified him to be perhaps, a
more efficient servant. It was in the
option of Smith to employ him, if single,
and to decline his service, if married. It
would be a preposterous impertinence on
the part of a court to tell this poor man
that he should not take the job offered
him, unless he could take it with freedom
to contract family obligations. Courts
that lessened a man's earning power, in
this arbitrary fashion, should be made to
insure a subsistence to the victim of their
meddlesomeness. Jones was able to earn
$500 per year, on promising his whole
time and attention to his master. He
would not, possibly, have been worth $400,
if his energy and time were to be divided
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between master and family. Are we to
say then, that a man whose earning power
is limited to $400 a year, shall not restrain
himself from forming a family; shall not
contract for the sake of an additional hunt
dred dollars, to refrain from forming one?
Is it really the interest of the state, that a
man with $200, or $300, or $400, earning
power, shall marry? And is it for the
court to make itself the mouthpiece of the
state, to declare so? And, has the individual no right as against the state ? If.
conscious of his limited mental and physical faculty for earning money, and unable
to get even a fair support for himself without agreeing with an employer to abstain
from marriage, he desires to make such a
contract, is he to be told that the state requires him to sacrifice himself, and waive
his chance of earning a tolerable support
for himself in order that he may bring into existence and then starve a progeny,
that, if it survived, would be as helpless as
himself?
It is to be observed that in most of the
cases cited, supra, the contracts were objectionable because of their character.
Two at least were mere bets. One or two
others were with marriage beneficial societies. No serious and worthy object of
the contract was apparent. The contract
between Jones and Smith is not of these
classes. Its object was praiseworthy, and
Smith's desire that Jones should remain
single if he should enter Smith's service
was not unreasonable. If in earlier centuries it was the policy of England and of
the United States to promote marriage
with a view to the growth of population,
it is not apparent that the circumstances
of the present demand th? same policy.
In so far as marriage is a conservator of
morality, it is to be remembered that there
are other moralities than the sexual, and
that some of those are worth preserving
even at some possible cost to these. It is
besides, not to be forgotten that the beneficial effect ofpreventing contracts looking
to a restraint on marriage is largely problematical, and that when the motives of
the parties are legitimate it is better not
to undertake to effect a good where accomplishment is doubtful at the certain sacrifice of the freedom of the parties, and of
their pecuniary and other interests
The learned court below, apparently

I2S

conceding the invalidity of the stipulation
with regard to marriage, has held that,
even though invalid, it does not vitiate
the rest of the contract. With this we
cannot agree.
Smith exchanged his
promise for Jones' ; Jones' promise was to
refrain from marriage, and, as a single
man, to render service as gardener. It
was supposed that the quality of the work
would depend on this singleness. No
tender of work, after marriage, would
have compelled Smith to accept it, unless
we can make a contract for him. The
promise to work is not separable from the
promise to be single while working. We
are not warranted in assuming that Smith
would have agreed to take Jones into his
employ at all, or, if taking him, would
have agreed to pay him $500 annually, but
for the promise by Jones of continuance,
single, in Smith's service for the rest of
the lifetime of the latter.
It follows, we think, that an action upon
the contract could not be sustained, if the
stipulatiq concerning marriage was illegal. But, it would not result that Jones
would be entitled to no compensation.
He has in fact abstained from marriage,
and has given a year's service. He is not
entitled to $500 because tha.t sum was the
price agreed on not merely for the service
and the abstinence, but also for the obligation to serve and abstain in the future.
By supposition, Smith did not procure this
obligation. He should not be compelled
to pay for it. On a count for a quantum
meruit, it would be the duty of the jury,
if furnished with the necessary evidence to
estimate the value of the services, using
the contract price as some indication of
the value set on the services by the parties.
Judgment affirmed.
JOHN TRAPP vs. COLD STORAGE
CO.
Warehousemen-Ordinarycare-Non-delivery, primafacie negligence.
STATEMIENT OF THE CASE.

Trapp applied to the defendants to receive eggs, inquiring how much ice it had
in the warehouse. After three months
the ice had so far melted as to be unable
to maintain the temperature below 38 degrees Far., the maximum consistent with
the preservation of the eggs. The company
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gave no notice to Trapp nor did it replenish the ice in the warehouse. The consequence was that the eggs were spoiled.
There was no specification by the parties
as to how long the eggs should remain in
the warehouse, or as to the degree of cold
that should be maintained.
Action of assumpsit.
PEIGHTEL and PHILLIPS

for the plain-

tiff.
Proof of loss or injury establishes a
sufficient prima facie case against the
bailee to put him on his defense. Am. &
Eng. Enc. vol. 3. p. 750; Safe Deposit Co.
v. Pollock, 85 Pa. 391 ; Logan v. Matthews,
6 Pa. 417.
Three months is not an unusual time to
have eggs in storage. Boswell v. Collins,
8 Atl. R. 845.
LONGBOTTOM and MILLER for the defendant.
A warehouseman is liable only for failure to exercise ordinary care. Backus v.
Stewart, 13 Fed. Rep. 69; McCarthey v.
New York, 32 Pa. 111.
What constitutes ordinary care in particular case is question for the jury.
Schwerin v. McKie, 51 N. Y. 180; Hatchet v. Gibson, 13 Ala. 587.
The burden is upon the plaintiff to establish negligence. Clark v. Spence, 10
Watts 335; Claflin v. Meyer, 75 N. Y. 260;
Boswell v. Collins, 8 Atl. R. 845.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

The facts of this case constitute the defendant a warehouseman. A warehouseman is defined to be, "one who receives
goods and merchandise to be stored in his
warehouse for hire." Bouv. Law Dict.
They are bound to use ordinary care of
the goods intrusted to them. Ordinary
care is defined to be such care and diligence which men of common prudence
generally exercise in their own affairs, due
regard being had to the nature of the thing
bailed and the usual means employed by
persons in the same business and under
like circumstances, in taking care of like
property. Rodgers v. Stophel, 32 Pa. 111;
Willey v. Allegheny City, 118 Pa. 490.
As to the duty ofproving this "ordinary
care" the cases are somewhat in conflict,
but the preponderance of authority seems
to be this: A bailor seeking to recover
from a warehouseman for the non-delivery
of goods or an injury thereto, must prove
negligence. When he shows that the
goods were not delivered on demand, or
were delivered in a damaged condition,
he has made a primafacie case. If the

defendant accounts for the non-delivery or
injury, by showing that the goods were
stolen or were lost, or damaged by fire, or
in any other manner consistent with the
exercise of ordinary care on his part,
the plaintiff's prima facie case is overcome, and he must prove positive negligence occasioning the loss. Am. & Eng.
Ency. of Law, vol. 3 p. 750 ; Safe and Deposit Co. v. Pollock, 85 Pa. 391 ; Logan v.
Matthews, 6 Pa. 417.
The facts of this case say the eggs were
entirely spoiled and do not state that the
defendant has any valid excuse for permitting them to spoil. But on the other
hand, there is sufficient evidence to prove
that the defendant's failure to use ordinary care was the sole cause of the damage. It was negligence on the part of the
defendant to permit the ice to melt so far
as to be unable to maintain the temperature consistent with the preservation of
eggs. It was the duty of the defendant
to replenish the ice in the warehouse, or
else to give the plaintiff sufficient notice
to remove his eggs. The fact that there
was no time specified for the holding of
the eggs does not alter the case. It was
the defendant's duty to hold them for a
reasonable length of time and it has been
held in the case of Boswell v. Collins, 8
Atl. Rep. 845, that three months is not an
unreasonable length of time to have eggs
in storage. Judgment for plaintiff.
GRoss, J.
HARLAN vs. WHITE.
E'ectment-1.ight of mortgagee to the possession of the mortgaged premises-Estoppel.
STATEiIENT OF THE CASE.

Harlan purchased, in 1887, a piece of land
of White, the latter and wife signing and
sealing the deed and delivering the same
in the presence of witnesses, receiving
in return a mortgage on said land for part
of purchase money, and the note of Harlan for the balance. The deed being consummated, the parties wereabout to disperse when White requested the plaintiff
to allow him to see the deed which Harlan produced from his pocket. White
promptly seized the deed and has ever
since refused to give it up, or return the
mortgage or the note, although he has
neverattempted to realize upon them. In
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fact White has treated the whole affair as
though it never was, and since built a valuable business block on the land in question. This was done with the full knowledge of Harlan who has manifested no inclination to assert any rights he may have,
until this present writ in 1902. It further
appears, that Harlan never intended to
assert any rights to the land, but that recently White treated him outrageously in
a business deAl and Harlan has been advised he can get even with White by
bringing this writ. White has always
collected rents and profits from the land
and Harlan has never protested until this
action.
JAMis and CISNEY for the plaintiff.

If a deed is delivered, no subsequent act
of the grantor (can impair its validity; if
one builds on land knowing it to be the
property of another, the owner is not estopped from setting up title to the land.
There can be no estoppel where the means
of knowledge are equally open to both
parties. Prutsman v. Baker, 30 Wis. 235;
Crest v. Jack., 3 Watts 238; LeFevre v.
LeFevre, 4 S. & R. '244.
EBBERT and MoREHoUsE for defendant.
Harlan having led defendant to act on
the supposition that he had no claim to
the land is now estopped from setting up
title.
One suffering another to make valuable
improvements on his land, cannot afterward set up title to the land if the improvements were made under a mistaken
idea as to title. Arnold v. Cornman, 50
Pa. 361 ; Mahl v. Pittsburg Ry., 158 Pa.
257; Adams v. Rockwell, 16 Wend. 285.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

The facts specifically state that the deed
was signed, sealed and delivered to the
grantee in the presence of witnesses, and
that the grantor received in return a purchase money mortgage together with a
note of the grantee for the balance of the
purchase price.
Upon the delivery of the deed to the
grantee the title to the land in question
passed to him and the mere hfnding back
of the deed to the grantor after the deed
had been fully executed and delivered did
not revest the title in the grantor.
But it has been argued that the giving
of the mortgage to the grantor vested such
title in him that the grantee cannot succeed in this action of ejectment.
In order to determine this question we
must determine the nature of a mortgage
in Pennsylvania.
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In Moliere v. Noe, 4 Dall, 450, it was said
per Tilghman, Judge, that the mortgagee
strictly speaking is the owner of the land
and may recover it in ejectment.
This was quoted with approbation in
Gilmore v. Comm., 17 S. & R. 276. In
Young v. Elmira and Williamsport R. R.,
it is said by Judge Sharswood: "That a
mortgagee or his assignee may maintain
ejectment and recover possession of the
mortgaged property before condition
broken, unless there be a stipulation to the
contrary in the instrument, is too well
settled in Pennsylvania to be any longer a
question."
In Tyron v. Munson, 77 Pa. 250, the
question was whether the mortgage was
merely evidence of a debt or a conveyance of an estate in the land to the mortgagee.
It was held that a mortgage passes to
the mortgagee the title and right to possession to hold till payment shall be made.
He may enter into possession before condition broken, and until condition is performed the title is as substantial and real
as if it were absolute.
It is an interest in land capable of enjoyment and not a mere lien. Gill v.
Weston, 110 Pa. 313 follows Tyron v. Munson. This was alease hold mortgage which
under the Act of April 2nd, 1855, was given
the same force and effect as a mortgage of
real estate and the mortgagee given like
remedies for protection and enforcement
of his securities.
It held that although the mortgage was
not due, the mortgagee had an action of
trover for the recovery of the goods mortgaged.
From the doctrine as laid down in these
cases, we are of the opinion that the contention of the counsel for the defendant,
that the mortgagee has a right to possession is correct, that the law in Pennsylvania gives him a right to possession even
before condition broken. But while this is
true the mortgagor has some rights under
the mortgage also and among them is the
right of redemption.
That this right may be maintained by
ejectment is held in Mellon v. Linn, 111
Pa. 56 and Wells v. Van Dyke, 109 Pa.
336.
In such cases it is the duty of the jury,
under the direction of the judge, sitting as
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chancellor, to ascertain how much the
mortgagee in possession has realized from
the rents and profits, and to render a verdict conditional upon the mortgagor paying any balance there may be due before
regaining possession. Miller v. Linn,
supra.
The contention of the defendant that
the plaintiff is precluded from succeeding
in his action of ejectmenit by estoppel is
not supported by the cases.
Where both parties have equal knowledge there can be no estoppel. Woods v.
Wilson, 37 Pa. 379.
Silence will not postpone where he who
seeks postponement is himself aware of
his title. Where both are aware of their
respective rights there can be no estoppel.
The cases cited by the counsel to support the doctrine of estoppel are cases
where there was ignorance of the true
state of facts on the part of the defendant.
No such ignorance existed in this case.
The defendant was fully aware of all the
circumstances. The peculiar condition of
affairs grew directly out of his act. At all
times during the erection of these improvements he knew of the outstanding title of
the plaintiff. If in the face of this knowledge he went on and improved the property, he cannot now set up the fact that
such improvements were made, to preclude the plaintiff from asserting his
rights. Nor is the plaintiff precluded on
the ground of laches.
Laches is such neglect or omission to assert a right as, taken in conjunction with
lapse of time, ,moreor less great, or other
circumstances causing prejudice, operates
as a bar in a court of equity.
The length of time from the delivery of
the deed to bringing this action is fifteen
years. We are no means certain that Harlan was in a position before this time to
bring this action or to pay the money due
on the mortgage. This taken into consideration with the other facts of the case,
is not in our opinion sufficient to preclude
him from bringing this action.
Judgment shall be given in favor of the
plaintiff conditioned upon his paying any
balance there may be due on the mortgage.
BENsAmIN, J
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

The intended sale of the land was conThe deed was delivered by
summated.

White to Harlan, In the presence of witness. Harlan delivered to White a mortgage on the same premises for one part,
and a note for another part, of the purchase money. By these acts, the land became Harlan's ; the note and mortgage became White's.
We are not called upon to decide what
would have been the effect of the handing
back by the parties of the documents respectively received by them, with the inten tion to restore the status quo ante. "An
estate once vested, cannot be divested by
the mere annulment and cancellation of
the deed." Tate v. Clement, 176 Pa. 550.
White and Harlan did not expressly
agree to a rescission ofthe executed contract
nor deliver each to the other, the deed and
mortgage and note. Of the two, but one,'
White, repented of the bargain. Obtaining possession of the deed by a xuse, he
has refused to give it up. He has retained
the mortgage and the note. He has also
retained possession of the land. It needs
no authority to support the assertion that
by such unilateral act, an executed contract or the rights acquired in virtue of it,
cannot be extinguished.
Fifteen years have elapsed. White during all this time, has supposed himself to
be as much the owner of the premises as
though the transaction had never occurred.
He has brought no suit on the mortgage,
or on, the note. He has with Harlan's
full knowledge built a "valuable bubiness
block" on the land. Harlan from the
moment of White's retaking of the deed,
has "manifested no inclination to assert
any rights he may have" until the inception of this ejectment. Will these facts
preclude him, now, from effectively claiming the land?
The learned court below has held that
Harlan is not estopped because White
knew all the facts which Harlan is now
alleging. Harlan has not deceived him,
by word or silence, and hence, cannot now
be prevented from claiming the land. In
the ordinary definition of estoppel it does
in fact presuppose a deception of one man
as to an objective fact, by the words, acts,
or silence of another. If the deception is
as to a present or future intention of the
alleged deceiver, it does not ordinarily
work an estoppel. Thus, If A orally agrees
that henceforth B shall be the owner of
what has heretofore been A's house, the
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law does not enforce the agreement, either
as a contract, or as an estoppel. The law
has furnished forms in which intention is
to be expressed. An expression in some
other form will not be binding.
But, there is a sphere whose boundaries
are not easy to describe, in which intention, expressed otherwise than in the
usually prescribed forms, will bind, and it
matters little whether this binding be called a contractual obligation, or an estoppel.
An instance is found in Bane v. Sutton, 3
Penny. 199. Sutton conveyed a house to
Johnson, in June, 1871, giving notes for
the price. These notes not being paid in
February,1872,Sutton demanded payment,
whereupon Johnson, living in the same
house, went out, procured his deed, and
the notes belonging to Sutton, brought
them back, threw them into the stove, and
burned them up, saying, "There, now,
you are paid. You have gotyour property
back just as you had it before". Johnson
then rented the house from Sutton, until
1877, when Johnson's heirs got possession
of some of the rooms of the house (a hotel)
claiming under Johnson's title. Holding
that the ownership was revested in Sutton,
the court remarks "It is not the case of a
parol sale from Johnson to Mrs. Sutton, so
as to permit the statute of frauds to defeat the effect of the act. It issuch an act
of spoliation, followed by the subsequent
action of the parties, as to estop him and
his heirs from invoking the aid of that
deed." What were the acts which thus
"estopped"? They were (a) the vendee's
destruction of the deed, to himself, an assertion in act, of an intention never to
claim the land; (b) his destruction of the
vendor's notes for the purchase money; (c)
his acting for six years in conformity with
his declared intention, i. e. not claiming
the land as his own and recognizing the
vender as owner, by accepting a lease. In
all this, there was no misrepresentation of
objective facts, the correction of which
would now work a fraud. There was
simply the expression of an intention not
to claim the land, and not to pay for it,
followed by acts through a series of years,
in harmony with this intention.
The facts before us are not similar to
those of Bane v. Sutton, but they suggest
the application of the same principle.
The vendee estopped himself there, by
destroying the securities given by him to

his vendor and by declaring his renunciation of ownership. The actor was Johnson. The estoppel was applied to him and
his heirs.
White's initial acts were not similar to
Johnson's. Harlan did not renounce the
ownership, destroy or deliver back the
deed, destroy his note and mortgage.
White, the grantor, was the party who repented, in the first instance, of the bargain.
He got possession of his deed, by a wile,
at the same time retaining the note and
mortgage. The day, or week, or month,
after this had happened, White could have

successfully resorted to an action to recover the deed, or the land. But, White's
acts were a declaration of a purpose to repudiate the sale, and Harlan understood
it so. Though White retained the securities, he did not enforce them. He has
allowed 15 years to elapse, and action on
the note is now barred. The mortgage
could be enforced only against the premises. Harlan meanwhile has shown
no inclination to assert a-right to the land ;
nay, until recently has had no intention
to assert any. The opportunity to take steps
to dispute the validity of White's effort
at rescission, was his, not White's. White
was in possession, both of the deed and
land. White evidently supposed that his
rescission had been effectual, or that Harian acquiesced in it. No dissent was expressed by the latter, at the time of the
artful retaking of the deed, or subsequently. A very large sum of money was spent
on the premises by White, evidently on the
hypothesis that Harlan was making no
claim; Harlan, whomust have known this,
refrained from indicating that he believed
he had a just claim, and would some time
urge it. Although White's original action
was not defensible, it seemed to be acquiesced in by Harlan. If Harlan is now allowed to controvert it, he will gain the
land without paying the note, and he will
gain the costly buildings which have since
been put on it. How large a portion of
the price was represented by the note is
not disclosed. It may have been smallit may have been large. We think that
the circumstances called on Harlan to
show that he dissented from White's rescission, before the statute of limitation
had barred the action upon the note, and
before expensive improvements had been
made to the land. If Harlan did not ac-
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quiesce in the rescission, he should have
spoken.
The case then is to be treated as if HarIan had, without writing, agreed to surrender to his grantor, and as if, in pursuance
of this agreement, the note given by him
for the price, had been destroyed by White,
and White had made the improvements.
Though not strictly an "estoppel", as that
word has beea defined, it is an equitable
exception to the rule requiring conveyances of land interests to be explicitly
made and to be in writing. The conduct
of Harlan justified White, after some time,
in inferring that Harlan acquiesced in
White's known intention to rescind, and
it furtherjustifies a court in giving effect
to this intention, in order to avoid inequitable results that otherwise would be inevitable. Cf. Redmond v. Saving Fund,
194 Pa. 643.
Judgment reversed.
COMMONWEALTH vs. PERRY.
Larceny-Inditmentfor "lawful money
of United States"-''Lawful money" defined-Sufficiency of indictment- Variance of proof from allegation in the indictment.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

The defendant is indicted for larceny of
property, which is described in the indictment to be "lawful money of the United
States." On the trial the district attorney proves the theft of "silver certificate"
and "national bank notes." Counsel for
the defendant contend there is a variance
but the trial court rules to the contrary
and the defendant is convicted.
This ruling is assigned for error on appeal.
DIVELY and VERA for appellant.
The indictment is insufficient. The
particular denomination or specie of coin
should be set forth.
People v. Battle, 14 Cal. 101; Crocken
v. State, 47 Ala. 53; Bartore v. State, 29
Ark. 68 ; State v. Hoke, 84 Ind. 187.
Where money described is of a particularity or kind, the evidence must show it
to have been of the quality or kind set
forth or the variance will be fatal.
Commonwealth v. Cohill, 94 Mass. 540;
Stewart v. Commonwealth, 4 S. & R. 194.
PRIcxrT and Yocum for appellee.
Bank notes ordinarily pass as money.
Bank of U. S. v. Bank of Geo., 10 Wheaton 346.
Bank paper in conformity with common

usage and understanding is regarded as
cash.
Ruth v. Jones, 9 Johnson (N. Y.) 120;
Warren v. Manes, 7 Johnson (N. Y.) 475.
An action for money had and received lies
for bank bills unlawfully received. Mason
v. Waite, 17 Mass. 560.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

The defendant is indicted for larceny of
property which is described in the indictment as "Lawful money of the United
States." On the trial the district attorney proves the theft of silver certificates
and national bank notes.
Counsel for the defendant contends there
is a variance, but the trial court rules to
the contrary and the defendant is convicted. This ruling is assigned for error on
appeal.
There is but one question necessary for
decision; that is, whether or not "national
bank notes and silver certificates are lawful money of the United States."
As to the first, or national bank notes,
we find they are issued by the national
banks of the United States, which banks
were devised to provide a national currency secured by a pledge of United States,
and are agencies or instruments of the
government for that purpose. f'n December 1861, the State banks (no other then
existed) suspended payment in coin, and
it became necessary to provide by law for
the use of the state bank notes, or to authorize the issue of notes for circulation
under the authority of the national government. The latter alternative was preferred, and in the necessity, thus recognized, originated the legislation providing,
at first, for the omission of United States
notes, at a later period, for the issue of
"national bank currency" (national bank
acts of Feb. 25, '63, and June 8, '64). Under these acts of congress the national
banks issue what are known as "national
bank notes."
Since these notes are issued by corporations which form no part of the govern:
ment, and, furthermore, have never been
declared to be legal tender, although they
pass currently, the court can see no reason or authority under which such notes
can be construed as "lawful money of
the United States."
As to silver certificates, we find they
are a legal tender for all debts, both public
and private, except duties on imports and
interest on the public debt. We think

THE FORUM
these two exceptions are sufficient to exclude these certificates fro'm coming within the charge under the indictment. Because this is a criminal charge, the term
"lawful money of the United States" must
be very accurately construed.
In a case somewhat similar to the one
at bar, 14 Cal. 101, it was held that the indictment for the larceny of $3,000, lawful
money of the United States, was not
sufficient; that the particular denomination or specie of coin must be set forth.
In a somewhat later case, (60 Ind. 193),
where there was an indictment for the
larceny of lawful money of the United
States, evidence of the larceny of national
bank notes does not warrant a conviction.
Since there is a variance in the charge
in the indictment and the proofs on the
trial, the verdict must be for the defendant.
HUBLER, J.
OPIN[ON OF THE SUPREME COURT.

The property alleged to have been stolen,
is described in the indictment, to be "lawful money of the United States." The
property stolen, is shown by the evidence
to have been "silver certificates and
national bank notes." No motion to
quash was made, on the ground that the
indictment does not with sufficient particularity describe the property, nor is it
alleged that the proof varies from the description in any other respect than that
mentioned. The only question then is,
are silver certificates and national bank
notes lawful money of the United States in
the sense which the words "lawful money
of the United States" ought to bear in an
indictment.
That they are "money," is not disputed.
Money designates, as well paper as coin;
if the paper is payable in coin and is not
unlawfully current in lieu of it. Webster
Diet.; Standard Dict.; Century Dict.; ad
verbum.
The word "lawful" as applied to money,
rmay have three senses at least. It may
describe that which is made a legal tender;
or that for whose existence and circulation the law makes provision, although it
is not made a legal tender; or that whose
existence and use'as money the law perMits, though it does not otherwise cause or
promote its existence and use.
Silver certificates are made by the United
States. They are adapted by form, impression, and denomination, to pass as

money. They are intended to pass, and
they actually pass as money. They are
even a legal tender to the United States
for customs, taxes and all public dues. The
issue of national bank notes is provided
for by the law of the United States. They
are receivable in payment of all taxes and
excises and all other dues to the United
States, except duties on imports, and in
payment of all debts owed by the United
States except interest on the public debt.
Both the certificate and the note are received freely in trade, discharging annually millions of debts, and the law
making power intended them to be thus
used, and has made express provision for
them and for this use. Why then are
they not "lawful money" of the United
States?
It would be an extremely nice definition of "lawful" that would confine it to
the possession of the property of being a
universal legal tender.
Indeed, no shbstance is such. No gold
coin is a legal tender for debts below one
dollar; no silver coin is a tender for debts
below ten cents or above five dollars.
Minor coins are not a tender for debts
above 25 cents.
No absolute quality
is expressed by the word "tender." It
implies a relation to a debt, to the size of
the debt, and to the commodity in which
the contract stipulates that it shall be dischargeable.
The authorities may not be harmonious
in respect to this question. In Martin v.
Bott, 17 Tnd. App. 450, 18 Am. & Eng.
Encyc. Law, 573, it was said "National
bank notes and gold and silver certificates
are lawful money, and so recognized in the
commercial exchanges of the United
States, but they are not a legal tender."
Under an Iowa statute making it criminal
for a bank officer to receive, or deposit, after the bank's insolvency, money, bank
bills or notes, United States treasury notes,
or currency or other notes, officers were
indicted for receiving a deposit of $200 "in
lawful money of the United States," a
particular description of which is to the
grand-jurors
unknown.
The
witness
who proved the making of the deposit,
said that he did not notice whether it was
national currency or greenbacks, or silver
certificates, adding "there might have
been a gold certificate." The court remarks that "In a general sense, such
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money [as is mentioned in the statute] is
any lawful money, which is circulated in
the United States." The court concluded
that the indictment was designed to include any money which was lawfully circulated in the United States, and hence
the words "of the United States" might
be rejected as surplusage. The court held
that a greenback, or a silver certificate, or
a gold certificate, ora national bank note
might be properly described as "lawful
money." State v. Boomer, 103 Iowa 106.
In an indictment charging theft of United
States treasury notes, defendant could be
convicted, on proof of his having stolen
silver certificates. Keating v. People,
160 Ill. 483.
There are doubtless decisions of a contrary tenor. Hamilton v. State, 60 Ind.
193, held that proof of theft of national
bank notes would not support a count for
the theft of "lawful money of the United
States," which is only coin or treasury
notes. Cf. also, Taylor v. State, 130 Ind.
66.
We think that the defendant should
have understood, as should any court,
that he was charged with taking the
number of dollars named, in gold or silver coin, or in greenbacks, or in national
bank notes, or in silver certificates, and
that the proof did not vary from the allegation.

COMMONWEALTH

vs.

JAMES

JAMESON.
Evidence-To impeach the character of
defendantfor truth-Rights of defendant when testifying in his own behalfImpeachment of witness by showing
priorconvictionsfor crime.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
Jameson was on trial for robbery.
Becoming a witness, he denied all participation in the robbery and testified to
an alibi.
The commonwealth on cross-examination asked him: "Have you already not
been convicted several times, at least three,
of larceny ?
His counsel objected to the question.
Objection overruled.
He then said he had not been.
He was asked whether on a fourth occasion, tried for larceny, he had pleaded
non vult contendere.

Court overruled objection to question.

Witnesses were called by the common.
wealth to impeach his character for truth,
also to prove they had been present in
court when he had been convicted on three
several occasions, and that he had on a
fourth occasion pleaded non vult contendere.
ALBERTSoN and WILSON for the commonwealth.
The questions asked defendant were
proper. Wilbur v. Flood, 16 Mich. 40;
The State v. Steele, 100 Mo. 606; State v.
Taylor, 118 Mo. 153; Commonwealth v.
Bonner, 97 Mass. 587.
The questions were not to show conviction but to lay a ground for rebuttal.
Walden et. al. v. Funden, 70 Pa. 460;
Games v. Commonwealth, 50 Pa. 319.
The negative answer of the defendant
prevented anyinjnry to his rights. Boyd
v. Boyd, 1 Watts 365 ; Houser v. Commonwealth, 51 Pa. 332.
The defendant having put his character for veracity in issue, by going on the
witness stand, the commonwealth can
give evidence tending to impeach such
reputation.
Commonwealth v. Borry, 8 C. C. R. 46;
Commonwealth v. Duckworth, 2 C. C. R.
443; Commonwealth v. Bonner, Mass.
587.
Houcic and FLYNN for defendant.
The appearance of defendant as witness
did not expose his character to impeachment as defendant.
1 Greenleaf Ev. 146, 444 b.; Commonwealth v. Hardy, 2 Mass. 317.
The general reputation of the defendant
for credibility could be impeached by his
general character for credibility and not
by evidence of particular acts or facts.
Rix v. Rockwood, 13 How. 20 ;U. S. v.
Masters, 4 Cranch 469, 493; Kimmell v.
Kimmell, 3 S. & R. 198; Chess v. Chess,
1 P. & W. 32; Snyder v. Commonwealth,
85 Pa. 519.
The answer of defendant was binding oui
the Commonwealth, 2 Taylor Ev. 1436;
Harris v. Tippett, 2 Camp. 637; Murphy
v. Commonwealth, 2 Green C. L. R. 662.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

The defendant in the present case was
on trial for robbery, and becoming a witness, denied all participation in the robbery
and testified to an alibi. The commonwealth on cross-examination asked him:
"Have you already not been convicted
several times, at least three, of larceny?"
The counsel for the defendant objected but
the objection was overruled and is now assigned as error.
On the agument of this case both the
counsel for plaintiff in error and defendant
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in error, stated that it has never been decided by the Supreme Court of this state
whether it is proper to ask a defendant a
question of this character, and after acareful examiintion of the authorities, we have
come to the some conclusion. It seems
very strange indeed that this question has
never been before the Supreme Court of
this state, for, from a personal knowledge,
we know that questions of this character
have frequently been asked of defendants
in our county courts, and has been before
the Supreme Courts of other states very
frequently. Having no authorities in Pennsylvania on this subject, the only possible
way to render a decision in the present
case will be to examine the decisions of
the different states.
In Newcomb v. Griswold, 24 N. Y. 298,
where the defendant was on trial for trover, it was held "that it was proper to ask
the defendant on cross-examination
whether he had been convicted of petit
larceny." The objection in this case was
that there was better evidence to show
this fact. It may be argued by the plaintiff in error that the objection in this case
was that there was better evidence and
that the record should have been produced to show this fact, but we are inclined to think that this was not the objection put forth, for the reason that where
the defendant had answered this question
in the negative and the commonwealth
called witnesses for the purpose of showing that the defendant had been convicted
on three different occasions and that on a
fourth occasion he had pleaded non vult
contendere, the objection as to better evidence was not made.
If we presume that this was the objection made to the question asked by the
commonwealth, then we must presume
that'when these witnesses were called
for the purpose mentioned above, that the
commonwealth first gave evidence to show
that it was impossible for some reason to
produce the record. We think the objection
that was made to the question asked by
the commonwealth, was that it was incompetent and irrelevant to the issue. At
any rate, we will consider this objection
first, and in doing so, we think the ease
of Newcomb v. Griswold is almost a
parallel case with the present one.
The case of Newcomb v. Griswold was
followed by Brandon v. People in 42 N.
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Y. 265, in which the defendant, on trial
for grand larceny, was asked on crossexamination: "Have you ever been arrested
before for theft?" This was objected as an
attack upon her character, which she had
not herself put in issue. The court held
"that the question was a proper one, and
no suggestion of privilege having been
made the objection was properly overruled.
When she took the stand she waived the
privilege that defendant's, character cannot be attacked, and at the same time she
makes herself subject to the rules as laid
down for other witnesses. She cannot
claim the advantage of the position of a
witness and at the same time avoid its
duties and responsibilities." In Pennsylvania, under our Act of Assembly of May
2.3, 1887, a defendant on trial in a criminal
court, is not bound to testify, and if he neglects or refuses to testify, no presumption
is created against him and the court or
counsel cannot refer adversely to him during the trial. P. & L. Digest, vol. II. col.
It is also a well settled rule, in
4841.
Pennsylvania, that the defendant's character cannot be attacked until he offers himself as a witness, When he offers himself
as a witness, he wai'es these privileges and
stands upon the same grounds as any
other witness, and the only privilege that
a witness has, is the right to refuse to answer any questions, which, in the opinion
of the trial judge, would tend to criminate
him. In the New York case just cited,
this privilege might have protected the
defendant from giving an answer, as
the question asked was very different from
the one asked in the present case. If this
privilege had been advanced as an objection in the present case, it would not have
availed him anything, for the question
could not tend to criminate him, and no
trial judge would so decide.
The case of Conners v. People, in 50 N.
Y. 240, follows the two former New York
cases, and the only distinction between
them is the fact that in Conners v. People,
the question was asked a witness and not
the defendant. The court held that a
defendant, after taking the witness stand
must be considered as any other witness.
The counsel for the plaintiff in error
have called our attention to two New York
cases, which they claim sustains their
position that it was error to ask this question of the defendant. The first of these
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two cases was People v. Brown, in 72 N.
Y. 571, in which it was held that it was
error to ask the defendant, on trial for
forgery, how many times he had been arrested. Church, J., in that case, said: "I
deem it unnecessary in this case to determine whether this evidence would or
would not have that effect, because another objection was distinctly taken upon
the ground of privilege." Again he said:
"I think it was permissible to ask the defendant questions as to particular facts,
although such evidence would not be received from impeaching witnesses." The
court reversed on the ground that the
counsel could make the objection as to
privilege as well as the witness himself,
and consequently we cannot consider that
case in deciding the present one.
The other case cited by plaintiff in error
is in People v. Crapo, 76 N. Y. 288, in
which the defendant, charged with burglary and larceny, was asked if he had
not been arrested on charge of bigamy.
It was held by Church, J., "That it
did legitimately tend to impair the credibility of the witness and was incompetentfor any purpose." That case differs
very much from the present one, for the
reason that here defendant is charged
with robbery and was asked the question
if he had not been convicted of larceny.
In both robbery and larceny the element
of theft is present, making the question
clearly relevant. From the above cases,
we think it is clear that in New York
these questions are proper.
In State v. Seeter, 69 Iowa 717, and State
v. O'Brien, 81 Iowa 93, it appears that
when a defendant offers himself as a witness, he may be impeached and contradicted in same manner that other witnesses are, and that be may be examined on
cross-examination to show convictions of
crimes committed by him. From these
cases it appears that rule is well settled in
Iowa.
In Missouri it has been held that questions of this character may be asked of
witnesses for purpose of discrediting them.
State v. Miller, 100 Mo. 606; State v. Taylor, 118 Mo. 159, and State v. Pratt, 121
Mo. 566.
In Pennsylvania itis a general rule that
in order to discredit a witness you can examine only to his general character. This
is laid down in Kimmel v. Kimmel, 3 S.

& R. 336; Wike v. Lightner, 11 S. & R.
198; Chess v. Chess, 1 Poll. 32; Boyles' Ex.
v. Kreitzer, 46 Pa. 470, and Snyder v.
Com., 85 Pa. 519. Duncan, J., in Kimmel
v. Kimmel, says, "that a man who is called upon to give testimony, is always subjected to the investigation of his general
character. This the law supposes he is
ever prepared to defend, but, miserably indeed would be the situation of a witness,
if every transaction of his life was open to
inquiry." This we think a very good
argument when you are considering only a
witness in the strict sense of that word.
When a defendant makes himself a witness, he is said to make himself subject to
all the rules regarding other witnesses, but
we are of the opinion that he not only subjects himself to all these rules, but he
waives this rule as laid down by the cases
in Pennsylvania. This question was asked for the purpose of attacking his credibility, and when he waives the privileges
given him by the laws of the state by taking the witness stand, he should be pre.
pared for an attack on his credibility. For
these reasons we think the question was a
proper one.
Thus far we have considered only the
objection that this question was incompetent and irrelevant as affecting the credibility of the witness, and now we must
consider the effect of the objection that
there was better evidence and that this
should have been shown by the record.
We think the court erred in overruling
this objection, for the universal rule seems
to be that this sort of evidence should only
be shown by the record. In Com. v Bonner, 97 Mass. 587, it was held that a defendant in a criminal proceeding who
testifies as a witness at the trial, may be
asked on cross-examination, for the purpose of affecting his credibility as a witness, "if he has been in the House of
Correction for any crime," provided objection is waived that the record is the best
evidence. In Buck v. Com., 107 Pa. 486,
it was proposed to ask a witness whether
he had not been indicted and tried in this
court for embezzlement, and this with a
view to effect his credibility. Objected
to on ground of better evidence. Paxson,
J., said : "The question was improper. It
was an attempt to prove an alleged fact
by incompetent evidence. Production of
record is the best evidence to prove convic-
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tion of a crime." These cases we think
are decisive of this point, and for this reason we must reverse the judgment of the
court. It may be argued, and cases cited,
to show that there was no harm done the
defendant and consequently the court
should not reverse the judgment of the
lower court. We admit that there have
been cases in which the courts have refused to reverse the judgment of lower
courts for this reason, but we think that
where there is an established rule of law,
and the lower court allows a breach
of the same, the higher court should reverse, in justice to the defendant, and for
the reason that in no other way will we
ever have precedents that can be followed.
The defendant, on trial, should have the
benefit of all the rules of law, and when
there is an error committed by lower
court, it should be reversed.
The plaintiff in error has argued that
when the defendant answered this question in the negative, that it was conclusiveon the commonwealth. Although it is
not necessary to consider this point in deciding this case, still we think we should
touch upon it, as there seems to be considerable controversy about it. In Hildeburn v. Curran, 65 Pa. 59, the rule is laid
down that if a witness is cross-examined to
a fact purely collateral and irrelevant to
the issue and answers it without objection,
he cannot be contradicted. The first point
to be considered then is, what is the meaning of collateral and irrelevant? In this
same case this rule was laid down as a test of
whether a fact, inquired into on cross-examination, was collateral or not: "Would
the cross examining party be entitled to
prove it as a part of his case tending to establish his case?" In applying this test to
the case at bar, we would answer that
the commonwealth would not be entitled
to prove, as a part of its case, that the defendant had been convicted of larceny
three or four times, had he not gone upon
the stand and made himself a witness.
When he took the stand, the question
asked him was not collateral or irrelevant,
for thereason that it affected his credibility
and he himself put this in issue by taking
the stand. Another distinction is, that in
Hildeburn v. Curran, the defendant answered without objection. Therefore, we
are firmly of the opinion that defendant's
answer was not conclusive on the commonwealth.

It is not necessary to consider whether
the record should have been produced to
prove these convictions of larceny, instead of calling witnesses who were present, for there was no objection made and
we cannot consider it.
Judgment reversed.
DIVELY, J.

OPINION OF THE SUPREMEE COURT.

Jamison became a witness for himself.
He thus entitled the commonwealth to
examine into and if it could, to impeach
his credibility. The credibility of a witness may be variously lessened; e. g. by
showing previous statements made by
him, inconsistent with those now made,
by showing that his reputation for veracity is bad, and by showing that he has
on this or on that occasion violated the
law.

The commonwealth undertook to show
that Jamison had violated the law, by
committing larceny. Whether there may
be some violations of law which in no
way tend to show the violator unworthy
of the highest credit. we shall not now undertake to say. Doubtless, to sensible persons there may at times be merit in the defiance of law, as there was when, in the
days of slavery, exceptionally good persons assisted slaves to escape from their
masters. As a rule, those who thus disobeyed State and Federal law were among
the sturdiest and honestest and most reliable of citizens. The law was abominable and cruel. These persons recognized,
as did Seward and other statesmen, that
there was a higher law, which even the
people of the United States could not repeal, and that when the two laws, the
higher, not made by man, and the lower,
man-made, were in conflict, as they may
easily be, it "is better to obey God rather
than man," and therefore, it is better to
break the man-made law than to keep it.
It is likely that the credibility of William
Lloyd Garrison, of Wendell Phillips or of
William H. Seward would not suffer in
the estimation of intelligent persons, because they were known to preach and to
practice disobedience to an odious slavecode.
There would be little dissent, however,
from the proposition that a man who
could steal several times, would have
no invincible scruple, when on trial for
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an act of the same class, to testify falsely
in order to acquit himself.
But how is the prior criminal act of the
witness to be proven? In Stout v. Rassel,
2 Y. 334, decided in 1798, the defendant,
in a civil case, was not allowed to- ask one
of the plaintiff's witnesses whether he had
not been committed to the goal of Cumberland county as an accomplice of Savin"
"The credit of the witness," said the court,
"is only to be impeached by his general
character, and not by charges of particular
offences of which he had not been convicted." In Elliott v. Boyles, 31 Pa. 65,
it was held improper to cross-examine a
witness by asking him whether he had
not committed perjury in a designated
trial; and, a witness having denied, on
cross-examination, that he had robbed
Traverse, as the question was not proper,
the testimony of Traverse was inadmissible for the purpose of contradiction.
Hester v. Commonwealth, 85 Pa. 139, 148,
158.
Normally, as the learned Superior Court
clearly points out, the prior criminal act
of the witness, by which his impeachment
is attempted, must be established by a
conviction.
And how is the conviction to be established ? Not by the testimony of persons
in court who heard the return of the verdict, or who heard the sentence of the
court, or who have read the record of the
trial. The person thus condemned knows
no more of these facts than any other person who was an attentive auditor at the
trial, and it follows therefore that the
proof of the conviction of such person
should not normally be attempted by his
own testimony. Buck v. Commonwealth,
107 Pa. 486. In this ease, however, the
question put to the witness was, whether
he had not been indicted and tried for
embezzlement. He might have been indicted and tried and not found guilty.
Very frequently the question whether
the witness has not been in jail or in the
penitentiary is allowed in the trial courts
for the purpose of diminishing his credibility. Says Arnold, J., in Commonwealth
v. Barry, 8 Pa. C. C. 216, "The fact of imprisonment elsewhere (without regard to
the cause of it) is a fact which no one
knows better than the witness, and it may
be safely left tothe trial judge to say
whether he will permit a question to prove

it, to be put to the witness or not." It is
evident that the legitimacy of the fact of
imprisonment as a cause of lessening
credit, depends on its having followed a
lawful conviction; and to allow proof of
the imprisonment by the person imprisoned is indirectly to allow proof by
him, of the fact of conviction. As judge
Arnold points out, it is often very inconvenient to produce the record of conviction, but when that is the case, the privilege of asking the witness on cross-examination would be of little value, for in the
absence of the record, the witness could
deny his conviction with safety, and if
the record were present, the admission of
the witness would be of value only as it
identified himself with the person named
in the record. The conviction would be
fully proved by the record, without corroboration from him.
The witness may not be compelled to
answer the question whether he has been
convicted, because it disgraces him, and
because a (technically) better mode of
proof exists. Commonwealth v. Barry,
supra.
The court wasin error in deciding-if we
are to understand that it did so-that the
witness must answer the question. What
follows?
Had the witness admitted his conviction
in answer to the question, the appellate
court could not know how much this admission contributed to the verdict. The
defendant was his own most important
witness, and to weaken his credit with
the jury was to increase the probability of
his conviction. But, he did not admit
the conviction. On the contrary he denied it. The permission of an improper
question that did not educe a responsive
answer, could not well be ground for reversal. Phelin v. Kenderline, 20 Pa. 354.
Nor could it, if the answer was such as no
other medium of evidence could have
given, and as did no harm, but rather good,
to the person answering. The fact that
Jamison had never been convicted could
be proved by no record; could be known
by nobody but himself. His testimony
to it did not violate any best evidence
rule, nor was it anything but beneficial to
himself. We are not able to follow the
learned Superior Court in holding that the
permission of the question, or the recep-
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tion of Jamison's answer, was reversible
error.
The court overruled the objection to the
question put to Jamison, whether he had
on a former occasion, when being tried for
larceny, pleaded non vult contendere, that
is whether he had not contingently admitted his guilt. But, what the answer was,
if any, does not appear in the record. If
there was none, or if the answer was no,
no harm was done.
Witnesses were called to impeach Jamison's character of truth; that is, as we
understand, to show. that he had an ill
reputation for veracity. There was no error in this.
Witnesses were called to prove that they
had been present in court on three occasions when Jamison was convicted. Convictedofwhat ? But, it is clear that this was
no proper mode of proving a conviction of
anything. The record was the proper
vehicle. Oral testimony was not made
proper by obtaining a denial from Jamison, in answer to a question to him which
he had a right to decline to answer.
A similar objection lies to the question
addressed to witnesses concerning Jamison's plea of non vult oontendere. The
plea was of record. Besides, the plea is
not decisive of guilt, and to admit it, as
evidence of guilt, is to depart from the
principle that a past crime can be proven
only by a conviction and by the record of
the conviction. Buck v. Commonwealth,
107 Pa. 486.
But it does not appear that an exception
was taken to the admission of this testimony. The trial court cannot be convicted of error that does not appear on the
record, and it is not error for it to receive
evidence which one party offers, and to
which the other party offers no objection,
unless the evidence disclose governmental
secrets, which the parties have no right.
even when they agree, to reveal, or unless
in some other way, it is injurious to the
state, as distinguished from the parties.
The judgment of the trial court is reinstated and affirmed.
GALLAGHER vs. REYNOLDS.
Evidence-Power of appointment by will
-Adding to a will byparol evidence.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Wm. Kern gave by will a life estate to

14'

J. Reynolds and added: "On his death
I give my land to such persons as he may
by will designate, provided they are such
as I shall hereafter name to him. Should
he die intestate then I give my land to
John Gallagher."
J. Reynolds made a will devising land
to Robert Reynolds.
Gallagher, in the ejectment, seeks to recover the land.
Evidence by defendant that Kern had
orally named him as the person to take
after J.Reynolds was excluded by courtVerdict for plaintiff.
BENJAMiN and WILSON for the motion.

The plaihtiff must recover on the
strength of his own case, not on the weakness of that of the defendant. While
parol evidence is not admissible to contradict, alter or vary the terms of a written
instrument, yet it is admissible to identify
the subject matter.
Plaintiff cannot recover as S. Reynolds
did not die intestate. Covert v. Irwin
3 S.& R. 283 ; Davidson's Est.,' 17 Phila.
424 ; 155 Pa. 48.
TJANARD and COOK contra.

Parol evidence is not admissible to add
to a will. If the donee has failed to execute the power, plaintiff should recover.
Kern could not orally name the person
who was to take. 29 Pa. 50; 6 S.& R. 402;
26 Pa. 277.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

From the statement of facts in the present case, we find that by the will of Win.
Kern, S. Reynolds took a life estate in
the land in dispute with power to dispose
of the same on his death by will, to such
persons as he may designate. If the will
of Win. Kern had stopped here, there
would be no question as to the appointment of Robert Reynolds, made by S.
Reynolds in his will, as the power given
to S. Reynolds, in the will of Win. Kern,
would have been a general power and S.
Reynolds could have named any person
whom he may have desired; but Win.
Kern further provided in his will that S.
Reynolds should name only such person
or persons, as he (Kern) should hereafter
name to him. This provision in the will
changes the power given to S. Reynolds
from a general power to a special power,
and raises the question whether the power
was a valid one. As a general rule, a
testator, in disposing of his property, may
provide for any condition or contingency
as he sees fit, provided of course that the
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condition or contingency is not illegal or
against the rule of perpetuity. The condition or contingency in the present case,
on which Robert Reynolds was to take
land, was the naming of him by Win.
Kern to S. Reynolds.
Did Win. Kern
name Robert Reynolds? We have no
written evidence that Kern named Robert Reynolds, as neither the will of Kern
or S. Reynolds show this, but on the trial
of the case, Robert Reynolds, the defendant, offered evidence to show that Kern
had orally named him as the person to
take. This evidence was excluded by the
court, and in doing so, we do not think
the court was in error. The counsel for
the defendant have very ably argued that
this evidence was the best and only evidbnce to establish this point, and should
not have been excluded. We do not
think the learned Court excluded this evidence for the reason that it was not
the best evidence, but for the reason that
it was attempting to establish title to land
by parol, and consequently against the
statute of frauds. The statute, among
other things, provides that all interest in
lands, made or created by livery and seisin only, or by parol and not put in writing and signing by party so making or
creating the same, etc., shall have the
force and effect of leases or estates at will
only, etc.
The defendant in this case is attempting
to show a parol gift, and we think it comes
within the statute. It was held in Tyler
v. Eekart, 1 Binn. 377 ; Stewart v. Stewart,
3 Watts 253, and Eckart v. Eckart, 3 P. &
W. 332, that a parol gift is within the
statute, unless accompanied by possession
and impovements. In these three cases,
the gift was from father to son during the
lifbtime of father, and the court held in
eacli case that, to make the parol gift valid,
there must be a delivery of possession and
improvements. We think the case at bar
is a much stronger case than the ones cited
above, for in this case no possession was
thken during lifetime of testator nor any
improvements made, and consequently is
clearly within the statute.
For-these reasons we are of the opinion
that the evidence offered by defendant to
prove that Kern orally named him to take
land after- S. Reynolds was properly exeluded, and without this evidence it is
ear that the defendant, Robert Reynolds,

has no title to land, and no right to possession of same.
The next question arising is, what right
has the plaintiff, John Gallagher, to recover in this action ?
In an action of ejectment plaintiff must
recover on his own title, (Covert v. Irwin
3 S. & R. 283), and hence Gallagher must
show that he has the right of possession.
From an examination of the will of Win.
Kern, it appears that Gallagher was only
to take said land, provided S. Reynolds
died intestate, and from the facts it appears that S. Reynolds made a will devising land to Robert Reynolds. It has been
argued that this clearly defeats Gallagher's right, and he cannot recover in this
action under any circumstances. This
argument seems reasonable when not considering the statute of frauds, but when
you consider this, the argument in our opinion falls flat. There is no question that a
man may die intestate as to a part of his
property and testate as to the remainder.
and we think that in this case S. Reynolds,
died intestate as to the land in dispute, for
having decided that the power given S.
Reynolds in will of Win. Kern, was within the statute of frauds. All Reynolds had
was a bare life estate, and he had no power
or control over the remainder, and hence
Gallagher takes under the provision in
the will of Win. Kern. Motion for a new
trial is thereform overruled and judgment
entered on verdict for plaintiff.
DIVELY, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
If the devise of the power to S. Reynolds
was valid, and if this power was properly
exercised, it is clear that Robert Reynolds,
the defendant, has a good title to the land,
and Gallagher, not.
"Every will," says the act of April 8th'
1833, 1 P. & L. 1440, "shall be in writing,"
and, with an exception shall be signed by
the testator at the end, and shall be proved
by two or more witnesses. The will is
made up of parts. Every devise, every
bequest is a part of it. There can be no devise, without a devisee or without land
which is devised. If the will must be in
writing, each devise in it, to which effect
can be attributed, must be in writing ;
that is, the land devised 4nd the person of
the devisee must be defined in the writing.

THE FORUM
It is of course possible to make a will
was held void. Similar in principle to
which may employ some mode of identi- this ease, is that of Olliffe v. Wells, 130
fying the devisee, other than the use of Mass. 221. The will gave to Wells the
his name. A devise to ason notyetborn;
residue of the estate to distribute it "as
to one who may hereafter be in partner- in his discretion shall appear best calculatship with the testator, Stubbs v. Sargon,
ed to carry out wishes which I have ex3 Mylne & Co. 507, to such person as X
pressed to him or may express to him."
may by will, even after the testator's
It was held that the oral directions of the
death, appoint, would be valid. As the testator, whether given before or after the
learned court below remarks, "had Win.
execution of the will, could not be conKern's devise been to such persons, as S. sidered. As it was clear that Wells was
not to take any beneficial interest, and as
Reynolds should by will designate," it
would have been sound. The testator he was to have no discretion with respect
may also make a devise to such person as to the distribution of the fund, except for
he shall subsequently indicate. The devise the purpose of carrying out the testator's
is then not complete as in the cases just wisheg, and as these wishes had not been
mentioned, until such indication; but the expressed, as the statute of Massachusetts
indication, as it is a part of the devise, required for wills, by a writing attested by
must be made in the mode prescribed by
three witnesses, the devise was void.
statute for making a will or codicil; i.e.
A devise to a board of trustees, in trust
it must be written, and executed by the to establish and conduct a school for young
testator's signature. This principle has mechanics, "on plans to be hereafter dereceived various applications. In Lang- scribed by me, or in case of my death bedon'v. Astor, 16 N. Y. 9, it is said that a fore perfecting said plans, the school
testator who makes a bequest, cannot, in
above named is to be conducted on plans
the will, reserve a power to affect the be- which I have from time to time described
quest by conditions, which are not to be to most of the board of trustees herein
themselves written and executed as the named, and who shall approve of final
will has to be. In Habergham v. Vincent, practical plans in keeping therewith,"
2 Vas. Jr. 204, there was a devise to trus- was held void, because the testator intendtees, to pay debts, and then to convey to ed the trust to be governed by his own
persons named, with remainders in tail, plans, and he had not expressed these
the last of which was described as being to plans in writing with the attestation resuch persons as the testator should by any qfiired by law for wills. The testator, it
was said, could not refer to his own landeed or instrument, attested by two or
more witnesses, appoint. The Wills law guage used previously to the making of
prescribed three witnesses. The testator the will, and by such reference, make it a
subsequently made an appointment by
testamentary disposition. Smith v. Smith,
deed with two witnesses. It was held 54 N. J. Eq. 1. In Condit v. Reynolds,
that the deed could operate only as a will, 66 N. J. L. 242, the testatrix gave her
and that, as such it was void, because not
property to her husband for his life, and,
after his death, to such persons as he
attested- by three witnesses. In Thayer
v. Wellington, 9 Allen 283, the will gave
should by will appoint, subject to "such
to two persons $15,000 in trust to appro- change and instructions as I may, during
priate it "in such manner as I may by
my life, have expressed to him in regard
thereto." The directions intended, were
any instrument in writing under my hand
to follow the making of the will. It was
direct." The statute of wills required an
attestation by witnesses or proof of execu held, that the testatrix could not give
them "unless she did so by writing executtion in the presence of witnesses. By an
instrument bearing the date of the will
ed in conformity with the requirements of
the statute of wills." This she had never
but not attested or proven to have been
made in the presence of witnesses, the done. Cf.Bigelow, Wills, 61, 62.
The power given to S. Reynolds, was to
testator directed that the money should
be paid to the city of Cambridge for the be exercised not at his own discretion, but
support of the library of the Cambridge at that of the testator, expressed by a subAthenaeum. The bequest to the trustees sequent nomination of beneficiaries. Of.
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No nomina-

tion in writing, and proven by two witnesses, has been made. The devise is no
better than it would have been, had the
place for the name of the devisee been left
blank.
Following the devise to the appointees of
S. Reynolds, are the words "should he die
intestate then I give my land to John
Gallagher." The gift to Gallagher is conditional. Strictly, S. Reynolds has not
died intestate. He has made a will, and
named a devisee. It may be that this
devisee was suggested by Kern. It may
be that he is the kin of Kern, that would
have been his heir. Was it the intention
of Kern, in case the devise to his appointee,
through S. Reynolds, should not be able
to take effect, that the land should pass to
Gallagher? Kern may have felt sure that
he would suggest the appointees to Reynolds, and that if Reynolds wrote a will it
would be in conformity with his suggestion. He may have intended to give
the land to Gallagher, only in case Rey-

nolds (lid not leave a will, and this intention he has expressed. It would manifestly defeat the intention of the testator,
if Robert Reynolds was the very person
named by him to S. Reynolds, to pass the
land over to Gallagher. So far as we
know, Robert Reynolds is the heir and
the offer was made to prove that he was
also the designatee of the testator. As
Gallagher is, not within the terms of the
condition on which the devise to him is
made, he was not entitled to recover. Both
of the alternate remainders, that to the
appointee of S. Reynolds and that to Gallagher, are void, and, as to the reversion
after S. Reynolds' life estate, the testator
has died intestate. Gallagher has not
shown himself to be heir.
We have not been convinced, notwithstanding the able and lucid opinion of the
learned court below, that the condition
defined in Kern's will for the going into
effect of the remainder to Gallagher has
been realized. For this reason must judgment be reversed.

